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Nearly all defenses of the agent-causal theory of free will portray the theory as a 
distinctively libertarian one—a theory that only libertarians have reason to accept.  
According to what I call ‘the standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free will’, 
the reason to embrace agent-causal libertarianism is that libertarians can solve the problem 
of enhanced control only if they furnish agents with the agent-causal power. In this way it 
is assumed that there is only reason to accept the agent-causal theory if there is reason to 
accept libertarianism. I aim to refute this claim. I will argue that the reasons we have for 
endorsing the agent-causal theory of free will are nonpartisan. The real reason for going 
agent-causal has nothing to do with determinism or indeterminism, but rather with 
avoiding reductionism about agency and the self. As we will see, if there is reason for 
libertarians to accept the agent-causal theory, there is just as much reason for 
compatibilists. It is in this sense that I contend that if anyone should be an agent-causalist, 
then everyone should be an agent-causalist.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
I aim to establish the following conditional: if anyone should be an agent-causalist, then everyone 
should be an agent-causalist. I use the term ‘agent-causalist’ to refer to a proponent of the following 
view: 
Agent-causal theory of free will: an agent s’s action  is directly free only if s 
fundamentally causes .1 
                                                 
1 I here assume a product view of action, on which an event is an action in virtue of its causal history. According to this 
account, agents cause their actions. Alternatively, proponents of component views of action contend that an event is an 
action in virtue of its internal causal structure. For example, O’Connor maintains that agents do not fundamentally cause 
free choices, but rather free choices consist in the agent’s fundamentally causing ‘the-coming-to-be-of-an-action-
triggering-intention-to-so-act’ (2000, p. 94; cf. 2009, pp. 195–6). I am sympathetic to Clarke’s (2003, p. 25) contention 
that nothing of substance as regards free will depends on which theory we adopt. But regardless, none of my arguments 
turn on these issues. I will continue, for ease, to employ a product view of action, even when discussing the views of 
those who endorse a component theory. 
 Another complicating factor is that a proponent of the agent-causal theory might allow for the possibility of 
directly free action that is not fundamentally caused by the agent, so long as the agent could have either fundamentally 
caused this action or have prevented this action from occurring by exercising his power to fundamentally cause another 
action. In such a case my statement of the agent-causal theory would need to be amended. I return to this issue in n. 36 
below. 
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A few words of clarification are in order. First, I do not draw a firm distinction between free will and 
free action. The notion of action in the contemporary philosophical literature has broadened to 
include, in addition to bodily actions, mental actions—such as choice, effort, and attention. I will use 
the idea in this broadened manner. Second, it is common now to draw a distinction between directly 
and indirectly free actions. Directly free actions must satisfy some stringent set of demands, while 
indirectly free actions need not satisfy these demands, so long as they are suitably connected to (e.g. 
caused by) earlier directly free actions. Thus, proponents of the agent-causal theory of free will can 
allow for the possibility of free actions that do not fundamentally have substances among their 
immediate causal antecedents, so long as these free actions are suitably connected to other actions 
that do fundamentally have substances among their immediate causal antecedents. The focus of this 
paper will be restricted to directly free actions.   
Third, the agent-causal theory of free will requires that agents cause their free actions 
fundamentally or irreducibly. Contrast this with the event-causal theory of free will, which also 
envisages agents as causes of their directly free actions, albeit not fundamentally:   
Event-causal theory of free will: an agent s’s action  is directly free if and only if certain s-
involving mental states and events nondeviantly cause (in a special way) .2 
On this account, an agent’s causing a directly free action wholly consists in certain mental states of, 
and events involving, the agent (e.g. his desires and beliefs) causing the action in the appropriate 
manner (Davidson 1963, 1971, 1973; Goldman 1970; Brand 1984; Bishop 1989; Mele 1992; Enç 
2003). Event-causal theories of free will are reductionist: they seek to reduce the event of an agent’s 
                                                 
2 By ‘in a special way’ I have in mind ‘nondeterministically.’ Libertarians who endorse the event-causal theory will require 
that the mental events and states that cause directly free actions do so nondeterministically (Kane 1996; Clarke 2003).   
The qualification of nondeviance is required to exclude cases in which mental states bring about an event, but, 
intuitively, there is no action. For example, a spy’s belief that if he does not blink his eyes at a certain time, then the 
mission will go poorly and his desire to see the mission succeed might so unnerve him that he blinks his eyes at the right 
time (a nervous twitch). This event is caused by his belief and desire, but it does not seem to qualify as an action, since it 
was brought about through a deviant causal path (Davidson 1973). 
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bringing about a free action to states and events involving the agent bringing about the action. The 
agent-causal theory rejects this reductionism, affording the agent irreducible causal involvement—
causal involvement that does not wholly consist in the causal involvement of mental states and 
events involving him.3 I will use ‘the agent-causal power’ to refer to the distinctive kind of power 
that agents possess who satisfy the agent-causal theory of free will.   
Fourth, the scope of the agent-causal theory extends only to free action, not action per se. 
The agent-causal theory of free will is consistent with the following sufficient condition for action:  
an agent s performs an action  if certain s-involving mental states and events nondeviantly cause .4 
According to this condition, a thief’s robbing a poor box counts as an action if the event of the thief 
robbing the poor box is caused, in a nondeviant manner, by the thief’s desire to increase his net-
worth and his belief that he could realize this end by so acting.5 The proponent of the agent-causal 
theory of free will need only deny that this is enough for free action (O’Connor 2000; Clarke 2003). 
The fundamental difference between event-causal and agent-causal theories is that the former reduce 
the relevant agential activity (action, free will, self-governance, etc.) to the causal interplay among 
states and events involving the agent, while the latter requires the agent to be irreducibly causally 
involved. It is important to realize that we can have event-causal and agent-causal theories of 
different phenomena. We can have agent-causal theories of action, free will, self-governance, and so 
                                                 
3 Defenders of the agent-causal theory of free will disagree about whether states and events also are casually involved in 
the production of free action. On Clarke’s integrated agent-causal model, states and events are joint causes with the 
agent of free action (2003), while O’Connor denies them any such causal involvement in the production of free action 
(2000, 2009). 
4 Both O’Connor (2000) and Clarke (2003) explicitly concede that an event that is merely nondeviantly caused by apt 
mental states and events is an action. What they disagree about is whether causation by apt mental states and events is 
necessary for free action. O’Connor (2009) rejects it as a necessary condition, while on Clarke’s integrated agent-causal 
theory he accepts this condition as necessary and sufficient. On Clarke’s account, an event—even one fundamentally 
caused by the agent—is an action only if it is nondeviantly caused by apt mental states and events (see especially Clarke 
2003, p. 136). Free action on Clarke’s account must then be jointly caused by the agent and apt mental states and events. 
5 One important area of disagreement among proponents of the event-causal theory of action concern just which mental 
states and events must be among the causes of action. For important discussions of these issues see Brand 1979 and 
Mele 1992. 
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forth. The same goes for event-causal theories. It is open then to philosophers to accept agent-
causal theories of some phenomena (e.g. self-governance), while accepting event-causal theories of 
other phenomena (e.g. action). We must be careful, then, to specify clearly what the theory we are 
discussing is a theory of. As my analysis makes clear, I am concerned with the agent-causal theory of 
free will.   
 It would be a colossal understatement to say that the agent-causal theory of free will is 
unpopular. Notwithstanding the ingenious make-over this theory has received at the hands of 
philosophers such as Timothy O’Connor (2000, 2005, 2009), Derk Pereboom (2001, 2004), and 
Randolph Clarke (2003), the theory continues to be perceived as deeply obscure (Bratman 2000; Enç 
2003), explanatorily empty (Schlosser 2008), and scientifically primitive (Pereboom 2001).6 Some of 
the resistance to this view clearly stems from a failure to understand it.7 My aim in this essay is to 
assist in understanding the nature of the agent-causal theory—in particular the theoretical 
motivation there is for accepting it. Almost all defenses of the agent-causal theory of free will 
portray the reasons for endorsing the theory as belonging uniquely to libertarians.8 In this way it is 
                                                 
6 Revealingly, both Clarke and Pereboom (have come to) reject the agent-causal theory of free will. Clarke argues that we 
ought to conclude that agent-causation is metaphysically impossible, though he does not think we can have ‘a great deal of 
confidence’ in this verdict (2003, p. 209). Pereboom concedes that agent-causation is metaphysically possible, but argues 
that we have empirical reasons for denying its actual existence (2001, pp. 79–88). 
7 Witness Enç’s assumption that the agent-causal theory is committed to substance dualism (2003, pp. 19–21) or the 
common mistake that the agent-causal theory requires there to be two distinct kinds of causal relations (Bishop 1986, p. 
228; cf. Moore 2010, p. 30), rather than simply requiring one kind of causal relation that can take different kinds of 
entities as relata. This last point bears emphasizing. The agent-causal theory, as I envisage it, does not require the 
existence of two kinds of causal relations, but only requires that a single causal relation can take as relata two different 
metaphysical kinds, e.g. substances and events. On this point I follow Clarke 2003, pp. 186–93 (cf. O’Connor 2000, pp. 
67–74).   
8 An important recent exception to this claim is Markosian 1999, 2012. Nelkin 2011 might be another exception, but it is 
unclear whether she accepts the agent-causal theory of free will as I define it. She argues that deterministic worlds allow 
for ‘agent causation (understood as causation by a rational agent for reasons)’ (2011, p. 90). There is no mention of 
agents fundamentally causing their actions, and thus it is unclear that this is an instance of the agent-causal theory as 
defined above. Further worries emerge when she discusses the possibility that claims about agent-causation can be 
reformulated in terms of claims about event-causation. She responds to this possibility as follows: ‘However, even if 
there is no metaphysical difference, but simply two equally good ways of describing the world, the fact that agents can 
legitimately be said to be causes, brings back the agent into the picture of action’ (2011, p. 91; emphasis mine). This seems 
to give up on agent-causation. There is a metaphysical difference between agents who satisfy the agent causal theory and 
those who merely satisfy the event-causal theory. Moreover, contending that agents are ‘legitimate’ causes does not 
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assumed that there is only reason to accept the agent causal theory if there is reason to accept 
libertarianism. I aim to refute this claim.9 I will argue that the reasons we have for endorsing the 
agent-causal theory of free will are nonpartisan. If there is reason for libertarians to accept this 
theory, there is just as much reason for compatibilists. It is in this sense that I contend that if anyone 
should be an agent-causalist, then everyone should be an agent-causalist. Although my aim is not to 
defend the agent-causal theory per se, I believe my conclusion will place the theory in a more 
attractive light. First, libertarianism enjoys little more popularity than the agent-causal theory, and so 
for those philosophers who reject the agent-causal theory only because they reject libertarianism, we 
will have removed a rather large obstacle to accepting the agent-causal theory. Second, by isolating 
the core reasons we have for accepting this theory, we will, I suggest, be in a better position to 
appreciate its merits.   
I begin with a negative defense of this conclusion. In section 2 I present what I call ‘the 
standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free will’ and in section 3 I show that this 
argument, an argument that renders the agent-causal theory a distinctively libertarian one, is flawed. 
In section 4 I explain the true theoretical motivation for endorsing the agent-causal theory and show 
that these reasons are nonpartisan. In section 5 I conclude by way of reflection on how these 
conclusions affect the case for agent-causal libertarianism.        
 
2. The Standard Argument for the Agent-Causal Theory of Free Will 
                                                 
amount to claiming that they are fundamental causes. Event-causal theories will (or at least should) allow that we can 
‘legitimately’ say that agents are causes; what they deny is that agents are fundamental causes.   
9 Markosian (1999) also seeks to refute this claim by arguing that the most plausible version of the agent-causal theory is 
in fact a compatibilist one. I disagree with Markosian, though I will not press the point here. While we both defend the 
conclusion that the reasons for accepting the agent-causal theory are not uniquely libertarian in nature, we provide 
importantly different arguments for this conclusion. The most notable difference is that my argument will not tilt us 
toward or away from either compatibilism or libertarianism. The main reason for accepting the agent-causal theory, I 
contend, is thoroughly nonpartisan.   
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The standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free will consists of three argumentative steps: 
(i) that compatibilism is false; (ii) that event-causal libertarianism cannot secure enhanced control vis-
à-vis event-causal compatibilism, since the only necessary difference between these theories is that 
the former requires the presence of indeterminism and indeterminism cannot be control 
enhancing;10 and (iii) that furnishing agents with the agent-causal power provides them with more 
control than is possible on compatibilist accounts.11 Let us consider these steps in turn. The 
argument begins by contending that compatibilism is false. If all of our actions are the inevitable 
consequences of the past and laws of nature, then, so the thought goes, we are not the true sources 
of our actions or we cannot do otherwise (or both), and therefore we are not free.12 The conclusion 
of the first step of the standard argument is that indeterminism is necessary for free will. So right 
from the start the standard argument for the agent-causal theory takes place within an 
incompatibilist framework. The next steps in the argument aim to show how best to construct a 
model of free will given our incompatibilism.    
                                                 
10 The claim that ‘indeterminism is control enhancing’ for present purposes can be read either as the claim that 
‘indeterminism in and of itself is control enhancing’ or ‘indeterminism (at least when suitably located) entails the 
presence of control-enhancing features.’ One might deny that mere indeterminism (even when suitably located) is 
control-enhancing and yet argue that if indeterminism is, e.g., located at the moment of choice, then the presence of 
indeterminism entails the presence of some other control-enhancing feature, such as the ability or opportunity to do 
otherwise. For ease, I will not distinguish these two readings since nothing of present interest turns on which reading we 
endorse. 
11 The standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free will is endorsed by O’Connor (1993, 1995b, 2000, 2005, 
2009), Clarke (1995, 2000, 2003), and Pereboom (2001, 2004, 2007), though the precise details in these author’s 
presentations of the argument differ (sometimes in important ways). Chisholm (1966) may also have endorsed this 
argument, though he says too little for us to decide the matter one way or another. See n. 15 below for further discussion 
of this point. Important exceptions to this rule are Taylor (1966) and Steward (2012), both of whom argue that action 
itself requires that agents be fundamental causes. An important difference between their theories is that Taylor thinks 
that agent-causation is compatible with determinism, while Steward seems to deny this (2012, pp. 54–69). In effect, then, 
Steward’s argument for the agent-causal theory of action (rather than free action) also ends up making the reasons for 
going agent-causal partisan: we only have reason for accepting the agent-causal theory of action if we have reasons for 
accepting incompatibilism about action and determinism. I return to these issues in n. 17 below.   
12 Incompatibilists offer different arguments for their view and also contend that different aspects of free agency are 
incompatible with determinism. Some contend that determinism is incompatible with free will because it is incompatible 
with sourcehood (Stump 1999; Zagzebski 2000; Pereboom 2001), some contend that determinism is incompatible with 
free will because it is incompatible with the ability or opportunity to do otherwise (van Inwagen 1983; Ginet 1990; 
Fischer 1994), and others maintain that it is incompatible with both the ability/opportunity to do otherwise and 
sourcehood (Kane 1996). These differences in their arguments do not affect steps 2 and 3 and thus I will ignore them.  
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 The second step seeks to show that event-causal libertarianism falls prey to the problem of 
enhanced control—the problem of explaining how libertarian models of freedom secure more 
control than rival compatibilist models. Libertarians argue that agents in deterministic worlds are not 
free because they lack the necessary degree of control for freedom. It is incumbent upon them, then, 
to explain how agents in nondeterministic worlds can possess an enhanced degree of control relative 
to compatibilist accounts. Many have argued that event-causal libertarians cannot discharge this 
explanatory burden (Watson 1999, pp. 198–207; O’Connor 2000, pp. 27–42; Pereboom 2001, pp. 
41–54; Clarke 2003, pp. 95–107). These models of free will endorse the event-causal theory of action 
and augment it with a variety of further conditions in attempt to transform the event-causal theory 
of action into a theory of free will. But these supplementations notwithstanding, the only necessary 
difference between event-causal libertarianism and compatibilism—the only condition that event-
causal libertarianism requires that compatibilism cannot require—is that the former requires that 
some actions be undetermined.13 Therefore, it appears that if event-causal libertarianism secures 
enhanced control vis-à-vis event-causal compatibilism, it does so in virtue of requiring the existence 
of indeterminism. But the contention that indeterminism can enhance control has been widely 
rejected (Watson 1999, p. 206; Clarke 2003, p. 105; O’Connor 2009, p. 192). Gary Watson (1999, p. 
203) likens the idea to a kind of alchemy—trying to get gold from straw.    
The conclusion drawn by many is that event-causal libertarianism does not secure enhanced 
control with respect to compatibilism. According to Clarke, this is because:  
The active control that is exercised on [the event-causal libertarian view] is just the same as 
that exercised on an event-causal compatibilist account. The type of libertarian view in 
                                                 
13 There are often other differences between libertarianism and compatibilism. Consider Kane’s (1996) libertarian 
account on which self-forming actions play a central role. Although, to my knowledge, no compatibilist requires the 
existence of self-forming actions, they could, and the only necessary difference between their account of self-forming 
actions and Kane’s is that they would not require that these actions be undetermined. Hence, although there are 
contingent differences between event-causal libertarianism and compatibilism, the only necessary difference is that 
event-causal libertarianism requires that some actions be undetermined. Or so the standard argument goes.    
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question fails to secure the agent’s exercise of any further positive powers to causally 
influence which of the alternative courses of events that are open will become actual. (2003, 
p. 105)  
Given that the only necessary difference between event-causal libertarianism and event-causal 
compatibilism is that the former theory requires the presence of indeterminism, and given that 
indeterminism cannot enhance control (after all the presence of indeterminism does not furnish 
agents with any ‘further positive powers’), event-causal libertarianism fails to secure enhanced 
control.14 
The conclusion that event-causal libertarians cannot secure enhanced control is sometimes 
defended by arguing that event-causal libertarianism is susceptible to the problem of luck. Consider 
the following passages from O’Connor and Pereboom:  
A prima facie problem for [event-causal libertarianism] is to explain how the agent directly 
controls the outcome in a given case. There are objective probabilities corresponding to each 
of the possibilities, but within those fixed parameters, which choice occurs on a given 
occasion seems, as far as the agent’s direct control goes, a matter of chance. (O’Connor 
2000, p. xiii) 
With the causal role of the antecedent conditions already give, it remains open whether the 
decision will occur, and whether it will is not settled by anything about the agent …. So 
whether the decision will occur or not is, in this sense, a matter of luck. (Pereboom 2007, p. 
102)   
                                                 
14 In Franklin 2011 I argue that, despite these philosophers’ contention, event-causal libertarianism can solve the 
problem of enhanced control. If this conclusion is sound, then we already have reason for rejecting the standard 
argument for the agent-causal theory of free will. Below I will offer additional support for concluding that the standard 
argument is a failure: namely that the agent-causal theory lacks distinctive resources for solving the problem of enhanced 
control.   
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Both O’Connor and Pereboom employ these conclusions about event-causal libertarianism to 
motivate an adoption of agent-causal libertarianism, and so it may seem that they think agent-
causation is needed to help with the problem of luck rather than the problem of enhanced control. 
Consequently, it may seem like there is a second widely endorsed argument for the agent-causal 
theory, distinct from the one presented above. But we must be careful here. What I am calling the 
standard argument for the agent-causal theory contends that while event-causal libertarianism 
secures no less control than event-causal compatibilism, it also secures no more control. If 
O’Connor and Pereboom’s arguments for the agent-causal theory that we are now considering 
defend this same point—if they also contend that the main problem with event-causal libertarianism 
is that it fails to secure any more control than rival compatibilist accounts—then there is merely a 
verbal difference between the standard argument and O’Connor and Pereboom’s arguments. And 
indeed this is exactly what we find. This is particularly clear in the case of Pereboom. As he begins to 
defend his argument, he grants ‘for the purposes of argument, that [event-causal libertarianism] 
allows for as much control as does compatibilism …. However, following Randolph Clarke’s 
suggestion … the concern is that if decisions were indeterministic events, then agents would have no 
more control over their actions than they would if determinism were true ….” (Pereboom 2007, pp. 
106–7). Pereboom’s reference to Clarke is decisive for establishing that he is not offering a distinct 
kind of argument (even if there are other important differences in the details): the argument (which 
Pereboom calls the ‘disappearing agent argument’) is that event-causal libertarianism, merely by 
adding indeterminism, fails to secure any more control than compatibilism.   
The same is true of O’Connor, though the point is less clear. O’Connor has been running 
this kind of argument against event-causal libertarianism for nearly twenty years (1993, 2000, 2005, 
2009). Consider his presentation of the argument in his recent article defending the agent-causal 
theory:  
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However, according to many critics (myself among them), indeterminist event-causal 
approaches falter just here, in the fact that the free control they posit is secured by an absence, 
a removal of a condition (causal determination) suggested by the manifestly inadequate 
varieties of compatibilism. If there is no means by which I can take advantage of this looser 
connectivity in the flow of events, its presence can’t confer a greater kind of control, one 
that inter alia grounds moral responsibility for the action and its consequences. (2009, p. 192)   
Here again the focus is on event-causal libertarianism’s supposed failure to secure more control than 
compatibilism, and so O’Connor also seems to endorse the standard argument for the agent-causal 
theory.   
 The second argumentative step in the standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free 
will has various formulations, but the various formulations all drive home the same point: event-
causal libertarianism fails because it fails to furnish agents with any more control than is possible on 
compatibilist models of free will. The third and final step contends that unlike event-causal 
libertarianism, agent-causal libertarianism does secure enhanced control. Clarke argues that this 
model solves the problem of enhanced control because ‘such an account provides … also the 
exercise by the agent of a causal power (to influence which open alternative will be made actual) that 
is not secured by compatibilist views … ‘ (2003, p. 134; cf. Watson 1999; O’Connor 2000, 2009; 
Pereboom 2001, 2004, 2007). Whereas the only difference between event-causal libertarianism and 
compatibilism is that the former requires the presence of indeterminism, agent-causal libertarianism, 
in addition to requiring the presence of indeterminism, also furnishes agents with the agent-causal 
power—a power that agents lack on compatibilism. What then must we do to construct a libertarian 
account of free will that affords agents more control than is possible on compatibilist accounts? We 
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must furnish them with the agent-causal power, the power to fundamentally cause their actions. This 
is the standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free will.15  
 
3. Why the Standard Argument for the Agent-Causal Theory of Free Will Fails 
I will now argue that the standard argument for the agent-causal theory fails. The crucial assumption 
of the standard argument is that agents in deterministic worlds cannot possess or exercises the 
agent-causal power. To appreciate the need for the argument to make this assumption, suppose that 
agents in deterministic worlds can possess the agent-causal power. Then, while Clarke and others 
may be correct that agent-causal libertarianism secures more control than event-causal compatibilism, 
this is not the relevant comparison.16 What needs also to be shown is that agent-causal libertarianism 
secures more control than agent-causal compatibilism. If possession of the agent-causal power is 
compatible with determinism, and if possession of the agent-causal power is needed for freedom 
and responsibility, then compatibilists can help themselves to this condition and construct 
compatibilist accounts of the agent-causal theory. But now when we make the comparison between 
theories, agent-causal libertarianism appears to run into the same problem as event-causal 
libertarianism. Recall that the standard argument contends that the mere addition of indeterminism 
to event-causal libertarianism is insufficient to transform an unfree agent into a free agent because 
indeterminism cannot enhance control. But assuming that agents’ possessing the agent-causal power 
                                                 
15 Besides Taylor 1966, the only other prominent defender of the agent-causal theory who might be an exception to the 
rule is Chisholm 1966. Chisholm defends the agent-causal theory by first arguing that agents in deterministic worlds 
cannot be free and then by arguing that on an nondeterministic view of action, which Chisholm (wrongly) assumes 
requires that actions be uncaused, it is clear that agents are not free. But he says precious little about how the argument is 
to be developed on the nondeterministic horn. If the problem with indeterminism is that it affords agents no more 
control than in deterministic worlds, then Chisholm adopts the standard argument. But Chisholm simply does not say 
enough to allow us to confidently decide this point.            
16 Clarke actually does concede that logical and causal determinism are compatible with the existence of the agent-causal 
power (see Clarke 2003, pp. 163–4, 181–3). My claim here is that the success of the argument requires us to assume that 
possessing or exercising the agent-causal power is incompatible with determinism. I will explain below how these 
concessions make trouble for Clarke. 
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is compatible with determinism, then just as the only necessary difference between event-causal 
libertarianism and event-causal compatibilism is that the former requires indeterminism, so also the 
only necessary difference between agent-causal libertarianism and agent-causal compatibilism is that 
the former requires indeterminism. And if the mere addition of indeterminism in event-causal 
libertarianism was insufficient to transform an unfree agent into a free agent because indeterminism 
cannot enhance control, then the mere addition of indeterminism to agent-causal libertarianism is 
also insufficient to transform an unfree agent into a free agent. Therefore, if agents in deterministic 
worlds can possess the agent-causal power, the standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free 
will fails.17  
I will now argue that this is indeed a possibility: agents in worlds where either logical or 
causal determinism obtains can possess and exercise the agent-causal power. I define these different 
species of determinism as follows: 
Logical Determinism: logical determinism obtains in a possible world w if and only if for 
every possible world w* that has exactly the same laws of nature as w and is exactly like w at 
any one point of time, w* is exactly like w at every point of time. (Earman 1986, p. 13)18 
                                                 
17 Similar problems confront Steward’s argument that agency requires the existence of indeterminism. Her argument 
begins from the assumption that being an agent requires that one possess the power to settle. Let us grant this 
assumption for the sake of argument. What I want to call attention to is that her argument (2012, pp. 54–69) that an 
agent’s exercise of the power to settle some question (e.g. whether to ) requires the existence of indeterminism assumes 
that the agent-causal power is incompatible with determinism. She defends the putative connection between exercising 
the power to settle and indeterminism by arguing that there is no viable event-causal model of settling, and thus we must 
accept an agent-causal model if we are to build a viable model of agency. But this shows that the power to settle requires 
the existence of indeterminism only if the agent-causal power is incompatible with determinism: for if the agent-causal 
power is compatible with determinism, and if exercising the agent-causal power is really required for exercising the 
power to settle, then compatibilists can simply adopt the agent-causal model and construct an agent-causal compatibilist 
theory of agency (and free will). Steward’s argument that agency is incompatible with determinism, like the standard 
argument for the agent-causal theory of free will, depends on the assumption that possessing and exercising the agent-
causal power is incompatible with determinism, and thus Steward’s argument, like the standard argument for the agent-
causal theory, fails. 
18 I use the name ‘logical determinism’ merely to draw a contrast with ‘causal determinism’. Logical determinism is not to 
be confused with fatalism.   
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Causal Determinism: causal determinism obtains in a possible world w if and only if for 
every event e (except perhaps those at the very beginning of time), there is some event e* 
that causes e, and for every possible world w* that shares all and only the same laws and past 
as w, if e* occurs, then e* causes e in w*. (Clarke 2003, p. 4)  
Let us begin by considering logical determinism. In order to try to accommodate the possibility of 
reasons-explanations, it is common for defenders of the agent-causal theory to allow probabilities to 
be associated with how an agent exercises his agent-causal power (O’Connor 2000, 2009; Clarke 
2003). Suppose Jones, a recent high-school graduate who satisfies the agent-causal theory, is 
deliberating about whether to attend Yale or Harvard. Defenders of the agent-causal theory contend 
that Jones’s possessing various motives (desires, beliefs, cares, etc.) relevant to attending each school 
structures probabilities for his exercising his agent-causal power in making either decision. Let us 
suppose that given Jones’s motives, the probability associated with his exercising his agent-causal 
power to choose to attend Yale is 0.7, and suppose that Jones exercises his agent-causal power to 
make this decision. We can then explain, or so claim proponents of the agent-causal theory, why 
Jones made this decision by citing his motives that raised the probability of his exercising his agent-
causal power to decide to attend Yale to 0.7. Given our present aims, we need not worry whether 
these explanations are defective in some sense; the point here is that if we can conceive of 
probabilities being associated with how agents exercise their agent-causal power, we should have 
little trouble conceiving of the associated probabilities being 1.19 Someone who wishes to argue that 
the agent-causal power is incompatible with logical determinism must argue that while there can be 
probabilities associated with how this power is exercised, all such probabilities must be less than 1. 
But why can we not just as readily conceive of Jones’s background, upbringing, current 
                                                 
19 See O’Connor (2000, 2009) who defends this account of reason-explanations. Clarke (2003, pp. 138–44) criticizes 
O’Connor’s account of and offers an alternative model of reasons-explanation.   
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environment, and motivational economy being such that the probability associated with his 
exercising his agent-causal power to decide to attend Yale is 1? Given that the probabilities of 
exercises of the agent-causal power can be structured by an agent’s motives (and presumably other 
factors), we need a reason to think that the exercises of the agent-causal power can only have 
associated with them probabilities of less than 1. But it is hard to fathom what reason we might have 
for thinking this—and certainly none has been offered by defenders of the agent-causal theory.20 I 
conclude, therefore, that agents can possess and exercise the agent-causal power in worlds where 
logical determinism obtains.21   
 While this conclusion alone might have force to undermine the standard argument for the 
agent-causal theory of free will, some might argue that what really bothers incompatibilists is not 
logical determinism, but causal determinism (Stump 1999; Zagzebski 2000; Pereboom 2001). And so 
long as we might have reason to think that the agent-causal power is incompatible with causal 
determinism, defenders of the standard argument might seek refuge there. However, there is no 
more reason to think that the agent-causal power is incompatible with causal than logical 
determinism. Consider Jones’s causing his decision to attend Yale. Some defenders of the standard 
argument contend not that the decision to attend Yale could not be causally determined, but rather 
                                                 
20 Could one respond as follows: the agent-causal power is ‘the power for an agent to fundamentally cause which of two 
causally possible things happens (whether this be deciding between two options or simply not making any decision)’? 
For example, John Duns Scotus seemed to hold that the agent-causal power has a ‘hard-wired’ option of doing 
nothing—that is, not deciding a matter one way or the other, just then. All of my motives might point to willing to , 
but, says Scotus, I could refrain from deciding to  and this, it may seem, does not require that I have any particular 
antecedent motive to refrain from deciding at that moment. One could so define the agent-causal power—one could just 
stipulate that the agent-causal power is inherently nondeterministic—but this move will be of no help in patching up the 
standard argument. For although given this definition of the agent-causal power, no compatibilist account can make use 
of the agent-causal power, there will be a very similar power that compatibilists can make use of. Call this ‘the agent-
causal power*’: the power for an agent to fundamentally cause her action. The only difference between an account 
requiring that agents possess the agent-causal power and accounts requiring merely that agents possess the agent-causal 
power* is that the former account requires the existence of indeterminism. So agent-causal libertarianism will still fare no 
better than their event-causal counterparts. I am grateful to Dale Tuggy, Patrick Todd, and an anonymous referee for 
raising this concern. 
21 This of course assumes that the agent-causal power itself is possible. If one doubts that it is metaphysically possible to 
possess this power, then this point can be put thus: there is nothing about logical determinism per se that prevents agents 
from possessing (or exercising) the agent-causal power. 
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that the causally complex event of Jones’s fundamentally causing his decision to attend Yale could not be 
causally determined, or even caused for that matter (O’Connor 2000, p. 53).22 Let us refer to this 
kind of complex event as ‘an agent-causal event.’ Thus, the reason that possession of the agent-
causal power is claimed to be incompatible with causal determinism is that it is metaphysically 
impossible for an agent-causal event to have a sufficient cause, or indeed any cause.23   
 But why think this? Consider again Jones’s case in which he decides to attend Yale. Suppose 
that the motives favoring his attending Yale (his desires, beliefs, cares, etc.) make the probability 
associated with his exercising his agent-causal power to decide to attend Yale 1. Would it not then 
be plausible to conclude that it is possible that these motives cause Jones to make the decision? It is 
plausible to construe motives as exerting causal influence on agents. One might argue that the 
reason the probabilities associated with exercises of the agent-causal power are structured by the 
agent’s motives is that these motives exert a causal influence on the agent to exercise the power in 
the relevant way. The deterministic case will, again, simply be the limiting one. In such a case the 
agent’s motives will raise the probability of the agent’s causing a certain decision to 1 because the 
motives deterministically cause the agent to make the decision.   
                                                 
22 If we endorse a component theory of action, then the contrast will not be between decisions per se and an agent’s 
fundamentally causing a decision, but between events whose internal causal structure is exhausted by events causing 
other events and events whose internal causal structure includes substances fundamentally causing events. Recall that 
O’Connor endorses the event-causal theory of action. Given his component theory of action, he will say that a decision 
is an event with a certain internal causal structure, such as certain reasons causing an executive intention formation 
event. Rather than the reasons causing the decision, the decision consists in the reasons causing this special event. While 
O’Connor thinks, then, that decisions can be causally determined, he denies that an agent’s fundamentally causing an 
event can be causally determined.    
23 Notice that this strategy for showing that an agent’s possessing the agent-causal power is incompatible with 
determinism requires one to assume that an agent’s fundamentally causing an event is itself an event. If one instead assumes 
that this entity is an abstract entity (such as a fact (Kim 1976, pp. 173–6)), then an agent’s possessing the agent-causal 
power in a causally deterministic world is straightforwardly possible. After all, abstract entities are not happenings, and 
so the thesis of causal determinism does not require them to be caused, and so whether or not they are caused is 
irrelevant to whether an agent’s possessing the agent-causal power is compatible with causal determinism. In order to 
consider the strongest case for thinking that possession of the agent-causal power is incompatible with causal 
determinism, I will assume that an agent’s fundamentally causing an event is itself an event. I am grateful to Randy Clarke for 
raising this concern.    
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Now we need to be careful here: what is the proposed causal effect of the motives? It cannot 
simply be Jones, for Jones is a substance and substances are not of the right category to be effects. 
Perhaps the effect is Jones’s decisionevent-causal models may opt for this interpretation. But 
there seems to be another possibility: namely that the motives causally influence Jones’s making his 
decisionthey cause the agent-causal event. Agent-causalists will want to insist not just that motives 
influence the occurrence of decisions, but that they influence the agent in his making a decision. And 
a natural way to analyse this last claim is that the motives causally influence the agent’s 
fundamentally causing his decision.24 But this line of reasoning leads us to conclude that the agent-
causal power is also compatible with causal determinism. If it is possible that motives structure 
probabilities associated with exercises of the agent-causal power by exerting causal influence on the 
agent, and if it is possible that these motives causally influence not just the decision but the agent’s 
making the decision, then it seems possible for an agent-causal event to be causally determined.25 
O’Connor, however, has argued that agent-causal events cannot be caused, and hence 
possession of the agent-causal power is incompatible with causal determinism (O’Connor 1995b, 
2000, 2009). His argument unfolds by first considering how an event might cause a causally complex 
event that consists in an event’s (rather than a substance’s fundamentally) causing an event. For 
example, how might the lighting of a fuse cause the causally complex event of ‘the dynamite’s emitting a 
large quantity of hot gas [causing] the rapid dislocation of matter in its immediate vicinity’ (O’Connor 2009, p. 
196)? In such a case the lighting of the fuse causes this causally complex event by causing its first 
event-component, namely the dynamite’s emitting a large quantity of hot gas (O’Connor 2009, p. 
                                                 
24 Steward (2012, pp. 64–5) seems to accept this model of how motives causally interact with an agent’s fundamentally 
bring something about. If one adopts a component theory of action, we can translate this point thus: motives do not just 
influence the occurrence of the effects that an agent fundamentally causes, they influence the agent’s fundamentally causing 
these effects. 
25 Note that I do not need to show that this is the correct analysis of motivational influence. All I need to show is that it 
is metaphysically possible that motives so influence an agent, since what is at stake here is the compatibility of the 
possession of the agent-causal power and causal determinism. 
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197; cf. O’Connor 1995b, 2000). The model we have then on which an event causes a causally 
complex event simply reduces to the event’s causing the first event-component of the causally 
complex event. But this model cannot be applied to the agent-causal event. We cannot say then that 
the agent’s motives cause the agent-causal event by causing the first component of this complex 
event since the first component is a substance, and substances cannot be effects. O’Connor 
concludes ‘it is not clear that anything could (in strict truth) produce a causally-complex event of the 
form an agent’s causing of intention I’ (2009, p. 196).26     
The problem with this argument is that it is too weak to establish its conclusion. O’Connor 
needs to show that it is metaphysically impossible for the agent-causal event to be caused. What he 
actually shows, however, is that a familiar model for explaining how an event causes a causally 
complex event cannot be applied to the agent-causal event. This establishes that it is metaphysically 
impossible for the agent-causal event to be caused only if this is the only possible model. O’Connor 
gives us no reason for thinking that it is the only model of how something (a substance or event) 
causes a causally complex event. So, at best, O’Connor’s argument establishes that the agent-causal 
event cannot be caused in the way that merely causally complex events consisting wholly of events 
(and the causal relation) can be caused.   
Not only is this conclusion too weak for O’Connor’s purposes, it is also unsurprising: it is 
unsurprising that we find fundamental differences concerning the workings of fundamental 
substance-causation and fundamental event-causation. Only one with reductionist leanings would 
require that we model the causing of an agent-causal event along the same lines as we model the 
causing of a causally complex event wholly constituted by events. But agent-causalists reject this 
leaning and thus should be unmoved by the fact that fundamental substance-causation has different 
                                                 
26 O’Connor originally claimed that it is ‘strictly impossible’ for an agent-causal event to be caused (1995b, p. 186; cf. 
2000, p. 53), but seems now to have settled for this weaker conclusion. 
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properties than event-causation. This difference is no barrier to conceiving of the agent-causal 
event’s being caused. Again, to conceive of the agent-causal event being causally determined all one 
needs to imagine is that motives causally influence agents, and that they causally influence 
specifically the agent’s fundamentally causing a certain choice. And we can readily conceive of this.27   
I conclude, therefore, that exercises of the agent-causal power are compatible with logical 
and causal determinism, and therefore that the standard argument for the agent-causal theory fails.  
If Clarke and others are correct that agents who satisfy the agent-causal theory of free will possess 
more control than agents who merely satisfy the event-causal theory, and if this enhanced degree of 
control is necessary for free will and moral responsibility, then compatibilists can simply help 
themselves to the agent-causal theory. And this means that just as the only necessary difference 
between event-causal libertarianism and event-causal compatibilism is that the former theory 
requires indeterminism, so also the only necessary difference between agent-causal libertarianism 
and agent-causal compatibilism is that the former requires indeterminism. Thus, if the problem of 
enhanced control is a problem for some libertarians, it is a problem for all libertarians.28   
Unlike other proponents of the standard argument, Clarke explicitly concedes that agents in 
worlds where logical or causal determinism obtain can possess the agent-causal power (2003, pp. 
                                                 
27 This claim gains support from the growing literature on neo-Aristotelian accounts of causation (Molnar 2003; Lowe 
2008; Jacobs 2011; Mumford and Anjum 2011; Heil 2012; Jacobs and O’Connor 2013; Swinburne 2013). On this view 
properties confer powers on substances and causation is the exercise of irreducible powers. Many (though not all 
(Mumford and Anjum 2011)) see substance-causation simply falling directly out of this account. Since causation is the 
manifestation of powers, and since substances are the bearers of powers, it seems, so the thought goes, that substances 
must be causes (Lowe 2008; Swinburne 2013). On this view a substance’s manifesting a power is the substance’s causing 
an effect. Consider a case of my punching a window that results in the window’s breaking. I cause the window to break. 
On the present picture my causing the window to break consists in my manifesting various causal powers (moving my 
arm and so forth). But, one might argue, the event itself of the window’s breaking consists in a substance’s manifesting a 
power—namely the widow’s manifesting its fragility (cf. Mumford and Anjum 2011). So on this analysis of my causing 
the window break, the event that I bring about is itself an event consisting of a substance-causing. Built into the very 
fabric of this metaphysics is the possibility of the agent- or, more broadly, substance-causal event being caused. And if 
the substance-causal event can be caused, I see no reason to deny the possibility that it can be deterministically caused. I 
am grateful to an anonymous referee for helping me see this connection.     
28 See Franklin 2011 where I offer a solution to this problem that both event-causal and agent-causal libertarians can 
endorse. 
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163–3, 182).29 However, Clarke thinks that agent-causal libertarians still have a decided advantage 
over event-causal libertarians in solving the problem of enhanced control. In contrasting agent-
causal libertarianism with agent-causal compatibilism, he writes: 
the non-libertarian [agent-causal version] does not provide in any straightforward sense for 
agents’ originating or initiating their actions. Such an account allows that each instance of 
agent-causation—if not itself causally determined by events that occurred long before the 
agent in question existed (and hence over which that agent has never had any control)—is 
made inevitable by these events as they causally determine the action that is agent-caused. In 
contrast, the libertarian [agent-causal] integrated account … provides in a straightforward 
sense for agents’ originating or initiating their free actions. Thus, the difference between 
what we get on the two accounts is not just that there is, only on the libertarian version, an 
absence of any determining causes of the actions that are said to be free. Because there is 
this absence, on the libertarian version alone, we get origination, in a straightforward sense, 
of actions by their agents.30 (Clarke 2003, p. 163) 
Why does Clarke think that agent-causal libertarianism secures origination (and hence enhanced 
control), but agent-causal compatibilism does not? ‘Because there is this absence’—that is, there is 
the absence of determinism on the former theory. But then indeterminism can, pace the standard 
argument, enhance control. Clarke argues in this passage that agent-causal libertarianism secures 
enhanced control vis-à-vis agent-causal compatibilism because it requires the presence indeterminism. 
But this flies in the face of Clarke’s earlier objection to event-causal libertarianism, which assumed 
                                                 
29 I am grateful to Randy Clarke for bringing these passages to my attention. 
30 Clarke allows that the agent-causal power is conferred on agents in a law governed way so that ‘any agent who has that 
property when she acts agent-causes her action’ (2003, p. 182). On this conception, if the action of an agent who 
possesses the agent-causal power is causally determined, then the agent’s fundamentally causing her action is (logically? 
causally?) determined.  
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that indeterminism cannot enhance control. When arguing that event-causal libertarianism fails to 
secure more control than event-causal compatibilism, Clarke writes: 
The self-determination, ultimacy, origination, or initiation present with the second agent 
[who satisfies event-causal libertarianism] differs from that present with the first [agent who 
merely satisfies event-causal compatibilism] only by an absence: there is absent, with the 
second agent, other-determination, but there is not present any further sort of positive self-
determination, any further exercise of a positive power to determine what one does. (Clarke 
2003, p. 106) 
Here Clarke argues that event-causal libertarianism secures no more control than event-causal 
compatibilism since the former theory fails to furnish agents with any new powers, but rather simply 
requires the absence of determinism. The problem for Clarke is that the difference between agent-
causal libertarianism and agent-causal compatibilism also fits this description. Both agent-causal 
libertarianism and agent-causal compatibilism accord agents the power fundamentally to cause 
certain events (e.g. decisions). Agent-causal libertarianism differs from agent-causal compatibilism 
not in that it provides ‘any further sort of positive self-determination, any further exercise of a 
positive power to determine what one does’, but only in that it requires the absence of ‘other-
determination’, such as determination by the past and laws of nature. But, then, if event-causal 
libertarianism cannot secure enhanced control vis-à-vis event-causal compatibilism because 
indeterminism cannot enhance control, then agent-causal libertarianism cannot secure enhanced 
control vis-à-vis agent-causal compatibilism.  
This problem for Clarke bears out my claim that the success of the standard argument for 
agent-causal libertarianism requires us to assume that agents’ possessing and exercising the agent-
causal power is incompatible with determinism: for if this assumption is jettisoned, then agent-causal 
libertarianism, no less than event-causal libertarianism, must look to indeterminism as a control-
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enhancing feature. But if indeterminism can be control-enhancing, then perhaps event-causal 
libertarianism can secure more control than event-causal compatibilism, and so what reason then do 
we have for accepting the agent-causal theory of free will?31 
 
 
4. Putting the Self in Self-Determination 
Many may find the preceding conclusion congenial, perhaps confirmation of a long-standing 
suspicion that the agent-causal theory really has nothing going for it. But such a conclusion is 
premature. While the standard argument for the agent-causal theory is indeed flawed, there is a 
different source of motivation for this theory—one that I believe is both more powerful and 
broader in scope. We can be led to this source by reflecting upon the nature and role of the self in 
exercising free will. 
 Possessing free will requires possessing the power of self-determination—the power to 
intervene among one’s various and often conflicting motivations and to determine which course of 
action to pursue (Watson 1987). The concept of self-determination under consideration here is 
further elaborated by J. David Velleman and Michael Bratman: 
In a [self-determined] action, an intention is formed by the agent himself, not by his reasons 
for acting. Reasons affect his intention by influencing him to form it, but they thus affect his 
intention by affecting him first …. His role is to intervene between reasons and intention. 
(Velleman 1992, pp. 124–5)   
                                                 
31 In section 5 below I return to the case for agent-causal libertarianism.   
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The image of the agent directing and governing is, in the first instance, an image of the agent 
herself standing back from her attitudes, and doing the directing and governing. (Bratman 
2005, pp. 195–6)32   
Consider again the well-known case of a would-be thief deliberating about whether to rob a poor 
box at a local parish (van Inwagen 1983). He has reasons for both stealing and refraining from 
stealing. In favor of stealing, he has a great need of money, he knows he can get away with it, and he 
has easy access to the parish. In favor of refraining, he was recently struck by the vivid memory of 
promising his mother on her deathbed that he would live a good life. According to the event-causal 
theory of action, so long as one set of reasons (e.g. those favoring stealing) cause the corresponding 
behavioural events (e.g. those constituting stealing) in the appropriate manner, then the thief acts. 
On the event-causal theory of action, then, the agent’s causal role is exhausted by the causal role of 
states and events, specifically motivational states and events.     
Can the same be said of self-determination? Does self-determination simply consist in one’s 
motivational states causing various mental episodes (e.g. decisions) and behavioural movements (e.g. 
stealing)? It seems not: for an agent to exercise the power of self-determination is for the agent to 
intervene among his various motivations for action and to determine how to act on their basis. And 
in order for the agent to be self-determining he must play these intermediary roles. But the thief is 
not identical to either his entire motivational composition or some subset of it: he is not his desires, 
cares, beliefs, intentions, plans, etc., nor is he some combination thereof. Therefore, if the only 
features of the thief relevant to bringing about his decision to steal are his motivations, then the thief 
himself does not determine what he does. But if the thief himself does not determine what he does, 
                                                 
32 In case one worries that these descriptions of self-determination stack the deck against either reductionists or 
compatibilism, Watson, Velleman, and Bratman all argue that this notion of self-determination is compatible with 
reductionism and determinism. I am grateful to Andy Cullison for noting the importance of making this point explicit. 
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then he does not exercise his power of self-determination. It follows from this that exercises of the 
power of self-determination are not reducible to the causal activity of states and events.   
 Stated more formally, the argument runs as follows: 
(1) An agent s self-determines a decision d only if (i) s adjudicates between his various 
motivations for or against d, and (ii) on the basis of this adjudicating process s 
determines or causes d. 
(2) If the members of some set of states and events play the causal roles of (i) and (ii), then s 
plays the causal roles of (i) and (ii) only if s is identical to (some members of) this set of 
states and events.  
(3) An agent is not identical to any state or event or any set of states and events. 
(4) Therefore, if the members of some set of states and events play the causal roles of (i) 
and (ii), then s does not self-determine d. 
(5) Therefore, if s self-determines d, then s, and not merely states and events, causes s.  
 
Let’s call this The It Ain’t Me Argument, as it contends that if only states and events cause my 
decisions, then ‘it ain’t me’ that causes my decision, and thus I do not self-determine what I do. The 
first premiss is about the nature of self-determination. According to this premiss, the concept of a 
self-determining agent is first and foremost the concept of the agent playing a causal role in the 
genesis of action.33 Furthermore, this concept affords the agent a specific causal role—namely one 
of adjudicating between his various motivations for action and making a decision on the basis of this 
adjudication. What exactly this process of adjudication amounts to is controversial: perhaps this 
process requires agents to rationally reflect on these various motivations (Velleman 1992), or to 
form higher-order desires about which motivation they want to be effective in action (Frankfurt 
1971), or to weigh carefully which course of action they most value (Watson 1975) or care most 
about (Shoemaker 2003), or what their self-governing policies direct concerning how to treat these 
various motivations (Bratman 2000). But whatever else this process of adjudication is, it is a process 
in which the agent considers his various motivations for action and selects which course of action to 
pursue. Thus, the self-determining agent plays a causal role over and above the causal role played by 
                                                 
33 That the concept of self-determination is a causal concept is one of the most widely agreed upon premises in the free 
will literature, although there are important dissenters. See Ginet 1990, McCann 1998, Goetz 2009. 
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his specific motivations for action: he must intervene among these motivations and decide which 
ones to act on. The second premiss states that in order for an agent to exercise his power of self-
determination he must play this distinctive causal role: the role of the agent cannot be played by 
something other than him. After all, if the agent’s causal roles are played by something else (e.g. 
states and events), then how can we say he is playing them? Thus, if the agent’s causal roles are 
played by states and events, then he must be identical to (some of) these states and events. But the 
third premiss denies that the agent is identical to any set of states and events, and hence the agent is 
not identical to either a single motivation or collection of motivations. It follows from these 
premises that the agent himself, which is a substance, not a state or event (or set of states and 
events), must be fundamentally causally involved in the production of a choice in order to exercise 
his power of self-determination.34 
One might think that exercising the power of self-determination is not strictly necessary for 
performing a free action. Consider the weak-willed agent. When he acts weakly, it may seem that 
rather than intervening among his various motivations and determining how to act, he is often 
moved to action despite his determination concerning what to do, or at least in its absence.35 But 
weak-willed agents can act freely. So it might seem that there can be cases in which an agent fails to 
exercise his power of self-determination and yet still acts freely. Nevertheless, even in these cases we 
                                                 
34 When arguing that agent-causal libertarianism has decided advantages over event-causal libertarianism for solving the 
problem of enhanced control, Clarke contends that on event-causal libertarianism ‘we do not get an origination or 
initiation of actions by their agents in anything other than a figurative or interest-relative sense’ (2003, p. 164). Clarke 
does not explain or defend this claim, nor does he indicate how it fits with his earlier objection that event-causal 
libertarianism cannot secure enhanced control since it differs from event-causal compatibilism only by way of adding 
indeterminism. None the less, this passage suggests that Clarke may have had in mind the kind of argument that I am 
offering. If this is indeed what Clarke had in mind, then I am in agreement with him, and hope to have brought this 
point out more forcefully.   
Markosian argues that the intuition that the agent-causal theory is based on is not ‘a genuinely incompatibilist 
intuition. Rather, it is based on [the] intuition … that you cannot be morally responsible for an action that is caused by 
something outside of you, but not caused by you ….’ (1999, p. 270). While Markosian does not unpack this claim, it 
strikes me as close to what I have been arguing.    
35 Compare Tolstoy’s description of Evgeny Irtenev: ‘And suddenly passionate lust seared him, clutching his heart like a 
hand. As if by someone else’s alien will, Evgeny glanced around and went after them’ (1889, p. 188).   
25 
 
think that the weak-willed agent acted freely only if he could have exercised his power of self-
determination—only if he could have utilized this power to pursue the course of action that he 
judged best (cf. Velleman 1992, p. 127 n. 13). So while every exercise of free will may not require the 
exercise of the power of self-determination, exercising free will at least requires the possibility of 
exercising the power of self-determination. And according to the above argument, in order for it to 
be possible for the agent to exercise the power of self-determination, it must be possible that the 
agent as substance, rather than simply some state or event of the agent, be causally involved.36       
The It Ain’t Me Argument is, I submit, the real motivation for the agent-causal theory of 
free will. Observe that there is nothing about this argument that depends on views concerning the 
(in)compatibility of free will and determinism. The argument is independent of these issues and thus 
has import for both compatibilists and incompatibilists alike. The issue here is not the existence or 
relevance of determinism or indeterminism, but reductionism: can the agent or the agent’s role in 
self-determination be reduced to the role of states and events? Proponents of the agent-causal 
theory argue for a negative answer, contending that exercising the power of self-determination 
requires that the agent be fundamentally causally involved in the production of the decision.   
Now that we have unveiled the central reason for the agent-causal theory, we can see both 
how this theory is of broader scope and more attractive than it might have otherwise seemed.37  
                                                 
36 If one does adopt this view, then we are forced to rewrite the statement of the agent-causal theory above along the 
lines mentioned in n. 1. According to my current statement of the theory, an action is directly free only if the agent 
fundamentally causes the action. If we are to allow for weak-willed actions that are both directly free and yet not 
fundamentally caused by the agent, then we must qualify this statement, allowing that agents can perform directly free 
actions even if they do not fundamentally cause them, so long as the agents could have brought their agent-causal power 
to bear in certain ways. I am grateful to Neal Tognazzini for bringing this issue to my attention. 
37 Someone may be motivated to embrace the agent-causal theory of free will because they are after a certain kind of 
counter-deterministic power: one that is incompatible with both reductionism and determinism. In this sense their 
reason for accepting the agent-causal theory of free will is not nonpartisan—it is not a reason that compatibilists can also 
accept. However, my claim is that any argument that such a counter-deterministic power is necessary for free will must 
have two logically distinct parts. One part must show that the relevant power must been understood along the lines of 
the agent-causal theory of free will and not the event-causal theory. The other part must show that exercises of this 
power, at least free exercises, must be undetermined. The first part of the argument has to do with worries about 
mechanism or reductionism and the second part with worries about determinism. The crucial thing to realize is that 
these worries can and do come apart. If there is an argument showing that reductionism really is incompatible with free 
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There are two general lines of resistance to the agent-causal theory. First, one can argue that the 
agent is literally identical to the collection (or some subset) of his motivations. Let us call such 
theorists ‘identity reductionists about self-determination’, since they embrace a broadly Humean 
view of the self (Hume 1740, p. 252; Campbell 2000, 2006), denying (3). Second, one can argue that 
while the agent is not literally identical to any state or event, or collections thereof, the agent’s role is 
played by such states and events. That is, one can argue that an agent’s exercising the power of self-
determination is reducible to the causal interplay among states and events involving the agent. Now 
such a response may seem immediately doomed to failure as the concept of a self-determining agent 
is one of the agent playing a causal role over and above the causal role played by his specific 
motivations. Moreover, since the agent is not literally identical to any of these states and events, it 
may seem puzzling how their playing his role can count as his playing his role. But reductionists of 
this stripe have sophisticated responses. First, they contend that although the agent is not literally 
identical to his motivations, some of the agent’s attitudes have authority to speak for the agent 
because the agent is identified with them (Frankfurt 1971, 1987, 1993, 1994; Watson 1975; Velleman 
1992; Ekstrom 2000; Bratman 2000, 2005; Shoemaker 2003; Jaworska 2007). When an agent is 
identified with any such attitude, the attitude can stand proxy for the agent and in this way the 
attitude’s playing the agent’s role counts as his playing his role. Second, they contend that these 
special attitudes (unlike the agent’s specific motivations) play the causal role of the self-determining 
agent, adjudicating between and determining a decision on the basis of the agent’s other motivations. 
Such theorists, who we can call ‘identification reductionists about self-determination’, deny (2) and 
                                                 
will, then compatibilists can accept this. What compatibilists must reject, whether they embrace reductionism or 
nonreductionism, is that exercises of free will must be undetermined. So while someone’s ultimate motivation for 
accepting the agent-causal theory might be to articulate the idea of a counter-deterministic power, any argument that this 
power must be analysed along agent-causal (opposed to event-casual) lines will be nonpartisan: if it shows that 
incompatibilists should embrace the agent-causal theory, it also shows that compatibilists should embrace this theory. I 
am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me to make this point clear. See section 5 below where I further 
develop this point.  
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contend that the agent can count as playing a distinctive causal role even if his causal role is played 
by states and events that are not identical to him, so long as these are states and events with which 
he is identified. 
There are two broad possibilities when seeking to analyse the power of self-determination: 
reductionism or nonreductionism. Reductionists must endorse either Humeanism about the self or a 
theory of identification about agency. Therefore, proponents of the existence of free will must either 
accept the agent-causal theory of free will, Humeanism about the self, or an identification theory of 
agency. When placed in this light, we see that that main motivation for the agent-causal theory is 
broader in scope and more powerful than we might otherwise have thought. Any compatibilist who 
has antireductionist sympathies cannot avail himself of the agent-causal theory under the standard 
argument. According to that argument, only libertarians (incompatibilists more generally) can 
endorse the agent-causal theory. But now we have come to see that the true reason to endorse the 
agent-causal theory is to avoid reductionism about the self and self-determining agency. This opens 
the possibility of the agent-causal theory being accepted even by compatibilists, and in this way 
allows the theory to be of broader scope. Furthermore, there are powerful objections to both 
Humeanism about the self and identification theories, and thus the alternatives to the agent-causal 
theory are questionable.38 Now, of course, many have contended that there are powerful objections 
to the agent-causal theory itself, and so perhaps in the end this theory will turn out to be no less (or 
                                                 
38 I do not mean to suggest that these theories are known to be false, but only that they are known to face serious 
objections. Consider Watson’s conclusion concerning identification theories: ‘We are left with a rather elusive notion of 
identification and thereby an elusive notion of self-determination. The picture of identification as some kind of brute 
self-assertion seems totally unsatisfactory, but I have no idea what an illuminating account might be’ (1987, p. 169). For 
subsequent attempts to provide illuminating accounts of identification see Velleman 1992, Frankfurt 1993, 1994, 
Bratman 2000, 2005, Ekstrom 2000, Shoemaker 2003, and Jaworska 2007. In Franklin n.d. I survey all these accounts 
and argue that they fail.  
Perhaps the most significant objection to neo-Humean (or bundle) theories of the self concerns their apparent 
incapacity to draw the proper boundary between essential and non-essential properties of the self (see Olson 2007, 
chapter 6) for critical discussion of the bundle view). For important recent defenses of the bundle theory see Campbell 
2000, 2006. 
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even more) problematic than the alternatives. But my suspicion is that many philosophers, when 
faced with these questionable alternatives, will give the agent-causal theory a second look.   
 
5. Agent-Causal Libertarianism 
By way of conclusion I want to return to the case for agent-causal libertarianism. I have sought to 
defend three claims in this paper. First, I argued that the standard argument for the agent-causal 
theory of free will fails, since possession of the agent-causal power is compatible with both logical 
and causal determinism. Second, I argued that the real motivation for the agent-causal theory is 
nonpartisan. The reason to accept the agent-causal theory of free will is that neither the agent 
himself is reducible to states and events nor is his role in self-determination reducible to the causal 
activities of states and events. The real issue motivating acceptance of this theory concerns neither 
determinism nor indeterminism, but reductionism. Hence, if anyone should be an agent-causalist, 
then everyone should be an agent-causalist. Third, I argued that an appreciation of the true 
motivation for the agent-causal theory reveals it to be broader in scope and more powerful than it 
otherwise may have seemed.   
 How do these conclusions affect the case for agent-causal libertarianism? They end up, I 
believe, shifting and multiplying the sources of opposition to this theory. Agent-causal libertarians 
usually focus their critical attention on event-causal libertarians, contending that indeterminism 
cannot be control enhancing. However, we have seen that agent-causal libertarians cannot make this 
claim—otherwise they end up undermining their own position in favor of agent-causal 
compatibilism. The issue between agent-causal and event-causal libertarianism has, thus, shifted 
from whether indeterminism is control enhancing (both positions are committed to indeterminism’s 
being control enhancing) to the issue of whether reductionism or nonreductionism about either the 
self or self-determining agency is correct. To refute event-causal libertarianism, agent-causal 
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libertarians need to show that we must opt for a nonreductionist theory of the self and self-
determining agency.39 But even if agent-causal libertarians can establish the truth of a 
nonreductionist theory, they have yet to show that we should be agent-causal libertarians. The source 
of opposition to agent-causal libertarianism has multiplied: agent-causal libertarians must also refute 
agent-causal compatibilism. The issue between these theorists is whether indeterminism enhances 
control and whether this enhanced degree of control is necessary for free will. It is important to 
realize that agent-causal libertarianism must establish both that indeterminism enhances control and 
that this enhanced degree of control is necessary for free will: for if they can only show that 
indeterminism enhances control, then it is open to agent-causal compatibilists to concede this and 
yet simply deny that this enhanced degree of control, although perhaps desirable, is necessary for 
freedom.   
 Establishing agent-causal libertarianism, then, depends on establishing three conclusions: (i) 
that exercises of the power of self-determination requires that agents qua substances be 
fundamentally causally involved in the production of their decisions, (ii) that indeterminism 
enhances control, and (iii) that this enhanced degree of control is necessary for free will. Agent-
causal libertarians (and incompatibilists more generally) have spent much time trying to show that 
the kind of control necessary for freedom can only be secured if indeterminism obtains. They have, 
however, spent little to no time directly defending nonreductionism about the self and self-
determining agency. I think this lacuna in their defenses is doubly problematic. First, in failing to 
directly defend their nonreductionism, they fail to address the central tenet of their theory: namely 
that the causal role of the agent in self-determination is not reducible to the causal role of states and 
events. Second, by failing to address this central tenet, they also leave obscure the most attractive 
                                                 
39 Most event-causal libertarians also fail to address the issue of reductionism head on. Ekstrom 2000 is an important 
exception to this rule, as she defends an identification reductionist model of libertarianism. See also Franklin 2014 where 
I develop an identification reductionist model of libertarianism.    
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feature of their theory: namely avoidance of reductionism about the self and self-determining 
agency. It is time then that agent-causal libertarians and their critics face up to difficulties 
surrounding the nature and role of the self in exercises of free will—only then can we establish or 
confidently lay to rest the agent-causal theory of free will.40 
                                                 
40 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at 2013 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical 
Association and the Young Philosophers Lecture Series at SUNY, Fredonia. I am grateful to the audiences for their 
instructive feedback, especially Andrew Bailey, Mark Balaguer, Andy Cullison, Neil Feit, Michael McKenna, Rebekah 
Rice, and Dale Tuggy. Thanks to Randy Clarke, John Fischer, Dana Nelkin, Garrett Pendergraft, Derk Pereboom, 
Patrick Todd, and Neal Tognazzini for feedback that made this paper considerably better. I also want to thank two 
anonymous referees and the Editor of this journal for their helpful feedback   
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